AI agents raise the stakes. In a UK AI Security Institute study of 177,436 MCP tools created between November 2024 and February 2026, the share of "action" tools, those that modify external environments, rose from 27% to 65% of total usage, measured by downloads [1]. A scope that is too broad no longer only lets an agent read. It lets it change things.
Nobody owns the scope dictionary.
Scopes are created project by project. Duplicates and inconsistent names pile up in the identity provider, unused scopes are never removed, and access reviews cannot say what each scope allows. Every new integration starts with an investigation to find the right scope, and a forgotten scope can still be granted to any client.
Observed in practice. No public measurement exists yet.
Too broad, or too many.
One scope grants a whole system. Given to an AI agent, crm:write lets it change or erase the whole customer base, and one malicious instruction hidden in a document is enough to turn it. In reaction, teams create many narrow scopes, and every new feature then needs one more scope, one more review and one more setting.
The IETF notes that OAuth scopes are "sufficient to implement static scenarios and coarse-grained authorization requests" but "not sufficient to specify fine-grained authorization requirements" [2].
APIs think in resources, MCP tools think in tasks.
An MCP tool that refunds an unhappy customer may touch four APIs. Should it get a dedicated scope, or the ten existing ones? The debate slows down architecture reviews, and without an answer the tool often ends up with the sum of all the rights, far more than its task needs.
As a 2026 research paper puts it, "OAuth scopes bind to operators, not to the operations (operator + operands) implied by a user’s task" [3].
Consent fatigue versus over-privilege.
Many narrow scopes mean many authorization prompts. Users end up approving without reading, so their consent no longer proves anything, or they give up and the agent is not adopted. Product teams then bundle scopes back into broad ones.
The MCP security best practices list "Consent abandonment: users decline dialogs listing excessive scopes" among the risks of poor scope design, and "Bundling unrelated privileges to preempt future prompts" among common mistakes [4].
ScopeNeat helps you name an owner for each scope, shows where scopes are too broad or duplicated, and ranks each MCP tool by what its scopes can reach.